Abstract
Introduction 'Proletarians of All Countries Unite!'
The Marxian phrase appeared prominently in every issue of the Albanian communist party daily 'Zëri i Popullit' for the best part of half a century, when my small South-western Balkan country languished under the unique Hoxhite dictatorship. From a catchphrase it developed into a national identity symbol inviting the Albanian proletariat (not in the Marxian sense of the word) and the world proletariat to join forces in a "holy" war against world imperialism, monarchies, the privileged few, the forces that represented all forms of social and national oppression. At home, this phrase was designed to shore up the burgeoning dictatorship in its early days and to build it up into a symbol representing the newborn communistic state, the self-proclaimed state that purported to put democratic freedoms of the common people first.
In the Marxist theory, the group that holds power has the maximum control, which translates into the old communistic adage that the dominant ideology is that of the ruling class. The communists in power in Albania, as in most Eastern Bloc countries, were aware of the power of the media and of the fact that owning the media meant owning the minds and hearts of the people. Therefore, as a new breed of Marxian leaders, they relied heavily on the media in order to influence the people by seeking to instill new values for all Albanians and eradicating traditional ones.
Using examples of Albanian media representation during the communist period, I will try to analyze the role of the ideology in these representations and their direct influence in the creation of a national identity. The analysis requires first a simple tour into the nation and national identity, the site and ideology within which media texts function.
Elihu Katz in his mass communication researches has formulated questions about the nature of media effects. Do the media influence what people think and do? Do the media influence when people think? Whether the media influence what people think about or what people know. Do the media affect whom we identify with and where we feel we belong? (Liebes and Curran, 1998, p.16) What Katz suggests is how important the media is for actively constructing common identities and common solidarities. This means that the media are concerned not only with the diffusion of information to the public at large, but also, and this is particularly true for media events, with the dramatization of civil society and the creation of a common cultural framework for building common identities. (Alexander and Jacobs, 1998, p.28) Media events are episodes in the history of the nation state, and in the age of television, the relations between states, nations and peoples. They are among the most important forms that create, in Benedict Anderson's now wellentrenched phrase, "the imaginary community of the nation". Nations consist of people who in the main never meet, never know one another in any ordinary sense, but who nonetheless identify with one another, assume they possess outlooks in common and whose lives flow, largely, in steady harmony and uncoordinated coordination. This is the psychology of the nation as a sociological organism that moves calendrically through homogenous time: a solid community, invisible and anonymous, united by a shared reality existing under the date of a newspaper or the dailyness of the television broadcasts. (Carey, 1998, p.43) The task of picking up the threads that connect ideology and media is a demanding one. Referring to Croteau, when the scholars examine media products to uncover their ideology, they are interested in the underlying images of society they cater for. In this context, an ideology is basically a system of meanings that helps define and explain the world and that makes value judgments about that world. It is related to concepts such as worldview, belief systems and values. However, it is broader than those terms. It refers not only to the beliefs held about the world but also to the basic ways in which the world is defined. (Croteau and Hoynes, 2002, p.160) .
The pivotal problem of power is essential for the definition of ideology. In ideological terms, media messages not only promote the ideas and the worldview of the dominant class, as I will show later, but also contain and spread challenging opinions, as happens in the democratic societies, producing an output, which is not authoritative control but influence.
Analyzing a number of issues relating to the question of ideology, Ferguson stresses that ideology is about the way people relate to each other in specific societies, from the most personal to the most abstract levels. It is, in part, what we believe. However, it is also about the ways in which what we believe manifests itself in our behaviors as individuals, as communities, and as nations. (Ferguson, 2004) Sharing the same opinion with Ferguson (1998) , that there is no way that we can write about and research the media and representations of 'race' in the media and stand somehow outside ideology and the ideological, we can shift from here trying to explore the ideological content of media representations as valid sources that shape national identity. Before looking at and analyzing the ideological implications of media texts, I will consider first the question of nation and national identity.
Nation and National Identity
Issues related to nationhood, nationalism and national identity have been the objects of exploration for many scholars and theorists. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) face common hypothesis of what national identity means by dealing with key concepts of identity, national character, national history and nationalist psychology. What concerns them is how constructions of national identity influence the way in which people are mobilized in transforming societies, creating and redesigning nations. Miller (1995) will support the principle of nationality. He will recognize five elements that make up national identity. A community constituted by shared beliefs and mutual commitment, extended in history, connected to a particular territory and marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture -serve to distinguish nationality from other collective sources of personal identity.
Arguing from a supranational prospect held out by EU and defending the declaration of the French historian Ernest Renan ("Nations are not eternal. They had a beginning and they will have an end. And they will probably be replaced by a European Confederation."), Anne Marie Thiesse (1999) draws up a list of the symbolic and material items which any real nation need to possess: a history establishing its continuity through ages, a set of heroes embodying its national values, language, cultural monuments, folklore, historic sites, distinctive geographical features, a specific mentality and a number of picturesque labels such as costumes, national dishes or an animal emblem.
According to Anthony Smith what he means "by 'national' identity involves some sense of political community, however tenuous. A political community in turn implies at least some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all the members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong…" (Smith, 1993, p.23) Smith offers an analysis of what is a nation and describes two different models: the Western and the EastEuropean model of nation formation. The Western model of the nation is, in the first place, a predominantly spatial or territorial conception. According to this view, nations must possess compact, well-defined territories. People and territory must, as it were, belong to each other… A 'historic land' is one where terrain and people have exerted mutual, and beneficial, influence over several generations. The homeland becomes a repository of historic memories and associations, the place where our 'sages', saints and heroes lived, worked, prayed and fought. All this makes the homeland unique. Its rivers, coasts, lakes, mountains and cities become 'sacred' -places of veneration and exaltation whose inner meanings can be fathomed only by the initiated, that is, the self-aware members of the nation.
The second element is the idea of a patria, a community of laws and institutions with a single political will.
Concurrent with the growth of a sense of legal and political community we may trace a sense of legal equality among the members of that community. The legal equality of members of a political community in its demarcated homeland was felt to presuppose a measure of common values and traditions among the population, or at any rate its 'core' community. In other words, nations must have a measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas that bind the population together in their homeland (Smith, 1993, p.9-11) . The question of common culture has been the object for a cultural analysis of the nation. This is not about the application of a new method. Conducting a cultural analysis enables us to conceptualize the object with a specific and characteristic set of emphases. People are not merely legal citizens of a nation; in an important sense a nation is also a symbolic community, which creates powerful -and often pathological -allegiances to a cultural ideal; for example 'the British way of life'. Most often, as Ernest Gellner argued in his 'Nations and Nationalism ' (1983) , this cultural ideal is expressed in the motivation to unify, to create a congruence between membership of the political nation-state and identification with a national culture, a way of life. (Evans, 2000) Much of what goes to make up our sense that we belong to a unified nation as Eric Hobsbawm (2000) point out in 'Mass producing traditions, Europe, 1870 Europe, -1914 , consist of constructs in the form of public ceremonies, symbols, institutions and discourses invented no more than a century ago.
In this context, what it means for me to be and to feel an Albanian, and others as Greek, Italian, and American, is connected with an amount of cultural representations that serve to attain a national identity.
Going back to the models of nation, Smith recognizes the East European model as a rather different with added elements. He terms this model an 'ethnic' conception of the nation because its distinguishing feature is its emphases on a community of birth and native culture. Differing from the western concept, whether one stayed in his community or emigrated to another, he remained ineluctably, organically, a member of the community of his birth and were forever stamped by it. A nation, in other words, was first and foremost a community of common descent.
Behind the rival models of the nation stand certain common beliefs about what constitutes a nation as opposed to any other kind of collective, cultural identity. They include the idea that nations are territorially bounded units of population and that they must have their own homelands; that their members share a common mass culture and common historical myths and memories; that members have reciprocal rights and duties under a common legal system; and that nations possess a common division of labour and system of production with mobility across the territory for members. (Smith, 1993) George Schöpflin offers a developed analysis on the nature of myth, as a constitutive part of national identity. He gives a description of the two meanings of myth: the one popular meaning that refers to what we see in the press, as a story, as an invention, as a fabrication, something in which we do not believe. The second one defines myth as a set of ideas with a moral content told as a narrative by a community about itself. In this sense, myth may or may not be related to historical truth, though those who rely on the narrative generally believe that it is. At most, myth is a way of organizing history to make sense of it for that particular community. Furthermore, for myths to be energizing, they must have both a positive and negative polarity. The universal structure of myth is as a narrative recounting something evil being overcome by virtue. Myths, therefore, are an ineluctable aspect of collective existence. Indeed, all collectivities have them -they cannot exist without them.
Taking into account that belonging to a community is a key aspect of our humanity and that without sharing in collective meanings, we cannot make sense of the complexity of the world. So myth gives to the collective existence a temporal dimension, it roots the member of a community in a shared past which may be imprecise, but is felt to be authentic; it gives them a sense of a shared future. No community can exist without a sense of a shared past and a shared future.
What Schöpflin (2002) considers as one of the most controversial aspects of myth is its relationship to nationhood and nationalism. Nations are partly held together by their myths of identity, origins, future or other experiences. Crucially, as myth is an aspect of collective existence, it forms a part of the theories of collective action. Myths do help to sustain nations and nations rely on myth for that reason. Myths contribute to the creation of identity by establishing the boundaries of identity, by binding together the members of the nation, by excluding non-members through collective meanings by which individuals know themselves and their fellow members, recognizing without further reflection the tacit limits of solidarity, obligation and trust and pursuing transactions with a minimum of negotiation.
Schöpflin emphasizes the social role of the myth, defining myths as identity -constitutive narratives reproduced as a set of shared ideas by members of a nation to define their characteristics and boundaries.
Malinowski also stressed the social power of myth and the potency of its use in matters of political concern that have to do with the legitimation of the inequalities of privilege and status. Accordingly, the role of myth in a given social group includes the construction of a collective identity as well as the justification and sanctification of existing rules and leadership. (Cit. in Schwander Sievers, 2002, p.8) Considering the above and how myths are used in shaping national ideology, as well as how they affect the exercise of power, the object of my analysis will be the political and social context of Albania during the communist period. In this specific period, particular myths were created, transformed, used and manipulated in order to establish the legitimacy of leadership or to tell the Albanians about themselves.
Albanian Myths, National Identity and Media Representations
After the Second World War, Albania led by Enver Hoxha set out to align itself with countries of the Communist bloc, which had the same goal of building socialism according to the ideas and principles of the Marxist ideology.
A part of the philosophy, which Enver Hoxha sought to implement in the new Albania he envisaged to build, is found in the first two pages of the Declaration of the 2nd Meeting of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council of Albania on the Rights of Citizens, published on October 23, 1944.
"Throughout their centuries-long history, the Albanian people….have never submitted to their enemies and have heroically weathered through all the storms that swept their territory and threatened them with extermination….In the heat of their heroic war (World War II), the people laid the foundations of their democratic power cemented with the blood of their worthy sons and genuine patriots. The Albanian people took up arms, hurled themselves into this war of liberation, relying on their own forces and confident of final victory… For the first time in their history, the Albanian people have become masters of their destiny, finally determined to bury their past of suffering and build instead a new state in which they will live in peace and happiness, free and enjoying equal rights." (Cit. in O'Donnell, 1999, p.1) The Declaration contains two crucial statements: building a new state (emphasis on new) by 'relying on their own forces,' both of which would play such an important role over the years later.
Although Albania's history as such is outside the scope of this analysis, it is necessary that some mention is made of a few dominant themes which had a great impact upon the events explored in this essay.
Skanderbeg is the hero of the Albanians. Considered as the most successful general of his time, he managed to stem the advance the Ottoman Turkish armies for a quarter of a century (1443-1468). Upon his death, Albania succumbed to the Ottoman domination and remained under its rule until 1912. The 19th century marks the beginning of the Albanian national awakening, better known as Albanian National Renaissance, relying heavily on the iconic figure of Skanderbeg. Nationalism started as a phenomenon of an elite group of Albanians living abroad. It was based on the idea of the Albanian nationhood, with the aim of preventing the partition of Albanian territories among its neighbors.
For Albanian nationalists the reconstruction of the past was important to give evidence to the Albanians that they shared a common history. As with almost every Balkan nationalist project, an episode taken from medieval history was central to Albanian national mythology. The Albanian nationalists' choice was naturally Skanderbeg, who had all the components for building a myth. Skanderbeg was a rather well documented historical figure (about 400 books were published about him throughout Europe since 1561), and the memory of his deeds was alive in oral tradition, too. The nationalist writers needed to do nothing more than restore his image and his role as a national father figure. As with most myths, his figure and his deeds became a mixture of historical facts, truths, half-truths, inventions and folklore. Skanderbeg was made a national hero although his action had never really involved all Albanians. He became simply the national hero of the Albanians, the embodiment of the myth of 'continuous resistance' against their numerous foes over the centuries.
The transformation of Skanderbeg into a national symbol did not just serve national cohesion. Skanderbeg's myth became the national argument proving Albania's cultural affinity to Europe, considering that in Arberesh poems ( Albanian settlers in Italy) he was not only the defender of their home country, he was also the defender of Christianity. In the national narrative, Skanderbeg symbolized the sublime sacrifice of the Albanians in defending Europe from Asiatic hordes. (Misha, 2002) In November 28, 1912, Albania became an independent state; however. The mark of Turkish rule was all too obvious both in the religious groups, with Moslems being predominant, and in the psyche of the ordinary Albanian.
The cumulative effect of the various factors, which shaped Albania's past, was emphasis on independence and sovereignty as a must and a stepping stone towards a modern state. It was against this historical backdrop that Enver Hoxha assumed power.
Once the communists established themselves at the helm of the state, they set about devising a dynamic national ideology policy, focused on the molding of a national community, which meant developing a unified code of national values and symbols, thus creating the necessary formative framework, which would secure state control of society. It also meant minimizing the many existing social and cultural cleavages through 'socializing' and integrating the Albanians this side of the state borders into one homogeneous ideology of shared cultural and historical heritage.
In such a situation the doctrine of national unity, which must be seen as a reaction to prevalent insecurities in the Balkans in the aftermath of WWII, became central to national ideology during the communist period.
The task to ensure a common public, mass culture was entrusted to party ideologists in charge of the educational system and the media.
Ideological inculcation began at the tender age of prep school children. As the schoolchildren advanced to higher levels of the educational system, the tools of their indoctrination became more sophisticated.
During the Ideological and Cultural Revolution, soon after the 5th Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania, 1-8November, 1966, Hoxha delivered a speech in which he detailed the importance of teaching the population in a manner which lends itself to the building of a Communist mind-set:
"…We educate the people with the communist morality in order to build socialism and communism and, to complete this construction successfully, we educate them ideologically, morally, technically, right through the construction of socialism. This construction follows the basic laws which Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin teach us. This is the mother theory, the main outlines of which the communists must master first of all…" (Cit. in O'Donnell, 1999, p.115) Enver Hoxha was fully aware of the importance of inculcating and propagating the communist ideology from the early days at the head of the Albanian state inasmuch as control of people's minds meant control of the state.
"Zëri i popullit", the party newspaper of national circulation which never ceased publication since its first issue appeared in 25 August 1942, was seen as the main tool for the indoctrination of the masses. In the words of a leading writer, Dritëro Agolli, "Under the guidance of Enver Hoxha, our teacher, "Zëri i popullit", became the first university of the Albanian communist journalism." (Agolli, 1987, p. 184) It carried every single report on party meetings, conferences and congresses. The headlines featured news items about fulfillment of work quotas in this and that area, which were invariably set by the party, or the stern verdicts of communist inspired courts of law, ruthlessly punishing people's enemies. Also, the drive for the emancipation of women, the voluntary work done by teams of young "volunteers" for the building of the new socialist Albania, the eradication of religious beliefs and their substitution by Comrade Enver's lifegiving teachings (compare Chairman Mao's little red book of ten commandments), were part of these headlines. What he was driving at was to build a father figure similar to the image of Skanderbeg.
On the 25 th anniversary of its publication, "Zëri i popullit" (People's Voice) wrote: It is the essence of the 25 year-long history of Albanian communism. As you leaf through its pages, you reach the chapter devoted to the joys and problems of the people in the march of the revolution. The war is over but the fight for a better future is not. It calls for more sacrifices, more toil and sweat. The enemy is the rich merchant, the big landowner, and the diversionist bands that targeted party secretaries. The same People's Voice that thwarted provocations and sang the praises of a new breed of freedom fighters. Between the lines, you can picture in your mind the wheat fields of the cooperative farms and the voice of the farmers mingling with the rumble of farming machines… you can see the industrial parks going up and can hear the sirens announcing the triumph of the people. Socialism grows by defeating the Titoites, Khrushchevites, and the imperialist-revisionist blockades. The People's Voice became the ideological banner bearer of the revolutionaries. The enemies of the party hate this Voice, which strikes terror into their hearts and they seek to smother it. However, it booms loud and stern like an ocean in rage. It is the voice of the future…" ("The Brilliant Albanian word", People's Voice, 25.08.1967) This passage clearly shows the ideological extent of the message of the main party newspaper. In the recreating the history, it overemphasized the National Liberation War. The portrayal of party commissars and partisans sought to cultivate the myth that Albanians' centuries-long struggle against enemies was only crowned with the glorious victory thanks to the party.
The picture of Pandi Mele "The partisan's diary" is a good expression of this new mythology as one of the common compositions in Albanian socialist paintings. Here we see a partisan with a red star on his cap writing in his diary. What is he thinking and writing about? Naturally, he is not writing about the old nationalist myths. Instead, he is writing about the glorious victories of the battles against the occupiers of the country. He is writing about the Communism as the future ideology of the world and about the Albanian Communist Party as the only one, which would realize these aspirations in Albania. In his face are visible the red colored wounds. In his brightening eyes, one can read the hope that his dreams could come true, as well as his determination to be part of that dream, to be 'a strong brick' in the Communist Albanian building.
The regime, however, needed to cement the connection between past and present values. Hence, the imperative of creating the image of the new man --one that was present in every cell of society and filled every page of literary works, every art gallery and all aspects of culture. By presenting the dictatorship of the proletariat as power for the people, it attributed every success to the input of the new man who followed the voice of the party --the voice that drowns the noisome church bells and the cry of the muezzin from the minaret, who were identified with the rest of the political enemies. The result of intensive propaganda was the image of the new communist who builds socialist Albania with confidence in a better future.
Noel Malcolm (2002) in her study about Albanian myths will distinguish four major categories: the myth of origins and priority; the myth of ethnic homogeneity and cultural purity; the myth of permanent national struggle; and the myth of indifference to religion. Of these, the first is directly historical, concerned as it is with establishing a chronological priority over other peoples. But it also underlies other myths: it provides the identity of the Ur-Albanian people whose unchanging characteristics (ethnic homogeneity, cultural purity, national struggle and religious indifference) are then exhibited throughout Albanian history.
As mentioned earlier, because of conversion to Islam during the 500 years of Ottoman rule, Albania became a predominately-Moslem country in Europe, with about 10% of the population Catholic and about 25% Orthodox. From the nationalistic perspective, the three religions were interpreted as dividers of the Albanians. However, one of the leading figures of the National Renaissance, Pashko Vasa, wrote 'the Albanians' religion is Albanianism,' with the sole aim of uniting Albanians.
Enver Hoxha and the party propaganda machine adopted this catch phrase in the drive unleashed in 1967 for the eradication of religious beliefs, which he saw as a conservative force and, in Marx' words, the 'opium for the people.' With this fresh campaign, he sought to achieve two goals: to weld the Albanian nation together and to legitimate the creation of the new religion, i.e. communism. 'Zëri i popullit' became the tribune and mouthpiece of the party, which used the easily manipulated middle school students, who spearheaded the campaign against the three cults.
The party newspaper carried the torch, as in every previous campaign. One beautiful day in 1967, it announced that "25 girls at the cooperative farm in Kavajë called a meeting in support of the revolutionary campaign that began a few days earlier at the 'Naim Frashëri' middle school in Durrës."(People's Voice, 07.07.1967) The meeting is described as a fiery debate and wound up by resolving to 'smash the shackles of religious beliefs and superstitions'.(ibid.)
These country girls, members of the Albanian Labour Youth Union, were the advance guard of the detachments that formed in quick succession throughout the country under the battle-cry of emancipating themselves from backward customs and of becoming staunch fighters for the advancement of the ideological and cultural revolution.
They spared nothing, the old cannon law of the highlands, which 'made life hell' (ibid.) for the women, the reactionary role of Islam with its professed inequality of women in society, 'which was a tragedy for Moslem women', (ibid.). Furthermore, the Catholic clergy was branded indiscriminately as collaborators with Albania's enemies, with the fascist and Nazi occupiers, as well as with the British and American espionage.
The result of the dictatorship is a heap of names like reactionary, backward, fascist, hostile, revisionist and counter-revolutionary, with wide ideological connotations, which Hoxha and his faithful party picked carefully in order to persuade the society. In the name of the people's power, which purported to create an equal society, he justified the notorious people's tribunals that tried the elite of the country, bringing to the dock the freethinkers, and countless heinous MCSER Publishing, No 2crimes committed after they captured state power. In the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, they played with Weakness of Albanians: the undying dream of a free and independent state.
The media lived up to its reputation, spreading totalitarian propaganda, falsehood, and fabrications --effective tools of indoctrinating the masses. Generations were taught to utter the name of the party in the same way as one utters the name of God. By the same token, people were supposed to cope with any hardship because the party --a caring mother or a god-like father figure if you like --was always there to give them guidance, support and strength. It ended up by building an idol capable of making rain and shine, a figurehead that personified the sacrosanct trinity: motherland, the cherished dream of freedom, and the essence of existence. The hero of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the good soldier Lei Pheng, had the Albanian counterpart with Garo from Durrës and his mother, Anushe, "who spent months working as volunteers in various construction sites for the building of socialist Albania," (Youth Voice,1968) . Shkurte Vata also, was the 16-year old girl that remained trapped in a landslide and died in an accident while working as a volunteer in a railroad project and her father took her place, always inspired by the party's teachings.
A significant interview with Anushe: These were the new heroes of socialist Albania, who fit perfectly into Verdery's definition of myths, which, in their capacity as sacred narratives embodying idealized representations of a collective past, present or future, can serve power seekers. They unite the individual with the group through the power of emotional attachment -they create feelings of, as well as moral justification for, belonging, pride, fellowership -and, for the same reason, define exclusion, the 'traitor', the other. When myths become politically controlled, there is little space for deviant thought -dissenters and freethinkers belonged behind bars. (cit. in Schvander Sievers, 2002) Communist and non-Communist Albanians perceived and interpreted differently this new mythology. The Communist ones accepted blindly this reality. Instead, the non-Communists faced two choices; a part of them admitted in silence. The bravest that dared to resist and oppose openly the communist ideology were imprisoned or condemned with death. The same destiny accompanied their families also.
Conclusion
Nowadays is well-known the central role of media as channels of communication and mediation between different structures, organizations, groups, and cultures in society, and how they provide the cultural environment from which common identities and solidarities can be constructed. According again to Katz, "the long term impact of mass communication will be in fostering or weakening national identities, promoting or undermining integration into political systems, supplanting or supporting intermediary agencies, reviving or revising collective memory, and supporting or retarding social change." (Liebes and Curran, 1998, p.18) In this respect, Albanian media of the communist regime, handing out a political action with political consequences, established itself as a national identity maker by focusing on those symbolic spaces of common meanings, values, beliefs and identities that make the people think and feel they belong to a collective cultural and political community, to a nation.
